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The Demand for Unilateral Secession in Catalonia: While 
the Cause is Compelling, Secession Would Not Be Legal 
Under International Law 
Logan Hayes 
Introduction 
Tensions between Catalonia and Spain have finally boiled over, 
leading to Catalonia’s decision to unilaterally secede from Spain. On 
October 1, 2017, an overwhelming 90% of voters chose to leave 
Spain in a referendum held by the Catalonian parliament.1 On Octo-
ber 10, 2017, Carles Puigdemont, President of Catalonia, gave a 
speech claiming that “with the results of the referendum on October 
first, Catalonia has earned the right to be an independent state.”2 The 
issue has now become whether Catalonia has the right, under interna-
tional law, to maintain their unilateral secession from Spain in order 
to form their own independent nation. This confrontation between 
Spain and Catalonia will force another international discussion on 
which situations may allow one part of a larger state to secede and 
become a new state. 
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue of unilateral 
secession in 1998 when Quebec attempted, but failed, to secede from 
Canada.3 The International Court of Justice (hereinafter “ICJ”) also 
addressed this topic in 1999 when it was determined that Kosovo had 
 1. Sam Jones, Stephen Burgen and agencies, Catalan referendum: preliminary results
show 90% in favour of independence, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/dozens-injured-as-riot-police-storm-
catalan-ref-polling-stations (nothing that it was during this vote that at more than 800
people as well as 33 police officers were hurt due to violent aids led by Spanish po-
lice).
 2. Official statement by the President, Carles Puigdemont, on the political situation in
Catalonia (Oct. 10, 2017) (on file with the Generalitat de Catalunya),
http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/303582/ca
  /official-statement-by-the-president-political-situation-in-catalonia.do (Puigdemont hoped 
that “the conflict between Catalonia and the Spanish state can be resolved in a manner 
that is serene and with accord, respecting the will of the people.”). 
 3. Judicial and Similar Proceedings Supreme Court of Canada: Reference Re Secession
of Quebec, Nov. 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1340 (1998) [Hereinafter Reference Re Secession of
Quebec].
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the right to declare independence through unilateral secession from 
Serbia.4 The analyses of these two major court decisions can high-
light which principles typically govern the court on matters of unilat-
eral secession. It is important, however, to note that these examples 
would merely be persuasive in determining the legality of Catalonia’s 
decision to unilaterally secede from Spain. 
This comment explores whether Catalonia’s unilateral secession 
would be deemed legal in the realm of international law.  Both the 
Canadian Supreme Court and the ICJ focused their analyses on two 
concepts: (1) the right to self-determination; and (2) territorial integ-
rity. The Canadian Supreme Court, in addressing the right to self-
determination, found that it is only applicable in instances where 
people were “denied meaningful access to government to pursue their 
political, economic, cultural and social development” through op-
pression.5 The Canadian Supreme Court also found that the concept 
of territorial integrity prohibits a unilateral declaration of independ-
ence unless it is authorized by that state’s constitution.6 Quebec was 
denied the right to a unilateral declaration of independence as they 
did not meet the aforementioned criteria. The ICJ, in addressing the 
declaration of independence by Kosovo, found that not only did Ko-
sovo not violate international law,7 but that the principal of territorial 
integrity did not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence.8 In 
applying the analyses and conclusions regarding both Quebec and 
Kosovo, it is clear that Catalonia cannot legally secede from Spain 
through a unilateral declaration of independence. The rulings made in 
Quebec and Kosovo are not binding, but can offer insight into how 
the international arena has addressed this issue in the past. Until there 
 4. United Nations Mission in Kosovo, On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001).
 5. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3 (A unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence is the first step to achieving unilateral secession).
 6. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3 (Each nation attempting to secede
must follow different steps that are dependent upon the requirements within the consti-
tution).
 7. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010  I.C.J. Rep. 403 (July 22),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf
[hereinafter Accordance].
 8. Accordance, supra note 7.
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is a true legal evaluation, the Catalans will continue to spread unrest 
throughout Spain and the issue will go unresolved. 
Background Facts and Legal Doctrine 
The Catalonian Crisis 
A Formerly Oppressed Country Seeks Independence 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established a framework for “a 
process of devolution of power;” authorizing Spain to be divided into 
seventeen self-governing Comunidades Autónomas.9 Each communi-
ty runs its own regional parliament and government; granting them a 
substantial amount of political power.10 Of these regions, Catalonia 
proved to have the strongest nationalist sentiment and greatest desire 
for autonomy throughout Spain’s history.11 In 1979, Catalonia 
achieved self-governance by passing a Statute of Autonomy, later 
updated in 
2005.12 This new Statute inspired Catalans to believe that they 
had the “right to decide.”13 Catalans view the “right to decide” as “the 
right to actually choose by themselves, in a unilateral manner, wheth-
er they want Catalonia to remain in Spain.”14 Catalans hoped negoti-
ating with Spanish authorities would facilitate a smoother transition if 
they decided they wanted independence.15 
According to Catalan secessionists, Spanish authorities violated 
the political agreement contained within the Spanish Constitution of 
 9. Víctor Ferreres Comella, The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s 
‘Right to Decide’ (Comment on the Judgment 42/2014), 10 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 571–
590 (2014).
 10. Id.
 11. Id.
 12. Comella, supra note 9, at 572 (Changes were made with the intent to reduce tensions
between the Spanish Constitution and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy).
 13. Id. (The “right to decide” being the right to self-determination through a unilateral
secession from Spain).
 14. Id.
 15. Id. (“The space for negotiation with the Spanish authorities would be larger, of
course, if the referendum were understood to be a mere expression of opinion, and not
the exercise of a political power to decide an issue unilaterally. If the referendum were
simply an instrument to test the political waters in Catalonia with regard to the status
of this region in Spain, secession would not be the only way out of the problem, even
if most people voted in favour of it. A new institutional arrangement that changed the
form and amount of self-government in Catalonia would also be part of the menu, as a
political answer to the dissatisfaction expressed by citizens.”).
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1978.16 They often say the Constitution is “politically dead” because 
the Spanish government has not adhered to the “spirit of the docu-
ment.”17 This Catalan secessionist opinion is deeply rooted in the 
Spanish Constitutional Court’s 2010 decision, which invalidated the 
2006 Statute of Autonomy because it failed to explicitly define Cata-
lonia as a “nation.”18 The original Preamble of the 2006 Statute of 
Autonomy claimed that Catalonia was a nation, even going so far as 
to acknowledge Catalonia as a “nationality.”19 As a result, in 2010, 
the Spanish Constitutional Court weakened the final version of the 
text that the Spanish legislative assembly produced, which was not so 
explicit.20 This is important because under Article 2 of the Spanish 
Constitution, the term ‘nationality’ “grants self-government to the 
′nationalities and regions′  that exist in Spain.”21 The Court explained 
that it “didn’t mean to” deny Catalonia’s legitimacy as an independ-
ent nation.22 However, the Spanish Constitutional Court determined 
that, both legally and constitutionally speaking, only Spain is a na-
 16. Comella, supra note 9, at 573 (The political parties in Catalonia have created a narra-
tive on “this process of ‘national transition,’” which has greatly impacted Catalan pub-
lic opinions).
 17. Id. (The Court’s 2010 decision was almost unanimous to the extent that the provisions
were found to be defective under the Spanish Constitution. This decision was reached
both by the majority opinion judges and the dissenting judges. Essentially, the dissent-
ers agreed with the majority, but would have invalidated more proposed provisions.
Thus, in addressing the validity of the articles that were ultimately declared unconsti-
tutional, the court essentialy agreed).
 18. Id. (In the original draft prepared by the Catalan Parliament, they explicitly defined
themselves as a nation. However, through editing and rewriting the statute, that
straightforward language was lost. Under Spain’s constitution a region like Catalonia
would be considered an autonomous community, SPANISH CONST. Dec. 27, 1978, art.
147).
 19. Id. (“The Preamble [of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy] was therefore to be read in
light of the Constitution, so that any suggestion that Catalonia is a nation had to be ex-
cluded. The Court explained that its analysis was exclusively legal: it did not mean to
deny the legitimacy of viewing Catalonia as a nation from historical, linguistic, cultur-
al, sociological or other perspectives. Still, the Court was probably too strict when it
insisted on the legal impossibility of defining Catalonia as a nation.”).
 20. Id. (This appeal to Spanish Constitutional Court because a political party, called the
Partido Popular, wanted to challenge the legitimacy of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy).
 21. Comella, supra note 9 at 574 (The Court found that the expression “Spain, a nation of
nations,” as seen in the Spanish Constitution, should be interpreted to show the “cul-
tural pluralism that characterizes Spain.” The Court ultimately determined that “the
Constitution only knows of the existence of the Spanish nation,” with no indication
that its autonomous communities could be considered nations).
 22. Id.
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tion.23 Catalan secessionists believed that the 2006 Statute of Auton-
omy was going to be a “new constitutional pact ′between Catalonia 
and Spain,′ which the Court ought to have respected.”24 This ruling 
prompted Catalans protests and declarations that: “We are a nation. 
We decide.”25 
The Invalidation of Sovereignty Leads to the Unofficial Refer-
endum of 2014 
On January 23, 2013, the Catalonian parliament passed a Decla-
ration of Sovereignty, which the Constitutional Court proceeded to 
partially invalidate.26 In response to the Constitutional Court’s partial 
invalidation, the Catalonian parliament held an unofficial referendum 
on November 9, 2014 to determine the “true will” of the people.27 
This referendum posed two questions to Catalans: (1) Do you want 
Catalonia to be a state? (2) Do you want that state to be independ-
ent?28 The people’s answer was a clear “yes” to both of those ques-
 23. Id.
 24. Id. (“According to this understanding, if Catalans voted for independence, negotia-
tions with the Spanish authorities would ensue, in order to work out the details of the
process of secession. But secession as such would be for Catalans to decide.”).
 25. Id. (The “secessionist movement has been able to mobilize a large section of the citi-
zenry in Catalonia. Its goal is for this territory to break its ties with Spain, and thus be-
come a new independent state. A powerful association (the Assemblea Nacional Cata-
lana) has organized several demonstrations in the streets. The most spectacular ones
have taken place in the context of the festivity of the Catalan Diada Nacional, which is
celebrated on 11 September every year. In 2012, the association gathered many people
in Barcelona under the banner, ′Catalonia, the next European state′.  The following
year, it organized a human chain in favour of independence, which ran from the north
of Catalonia to the south. These events showed that the movement had strong popular
support.”).
 26. Comella, supra note 9, at 577-8 (The Declaration of Sovereignty, also known as
Resolution 5/X of the Catalonian Parliament, approved the declaration of sovereign
entity and agreed “to initiate the process to exercise the right to decide so that the citi-
zens of Catalonia may decide their collective political future in accordance with the
following principles: sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, transparency, dialogue, so-
cial cohesion, Europeanism, legality, role of Catalan Parliament and participation.”).
 27. Catalonia vote: 80% back independence - officials, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29982960 (noting that this vote was non-
binding, more than two million people out of a possible 5.4 million eligible voters par-
ticipated).
 28. Id.
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tions.29 Of the 2.2 million people that participated, an overwhelming 
80% wanted Catalonia to declare independence from Spain.30 
On March 25, 2014, the Spanish Constitutional Court announced 
its ruling on the Catalan Declaration of Sovereignty.31  The Constitu-
tional Court invalidated the “principle of sovereignty” within the 
Declaration, but upheld “the right to decide.”32 In invalidating the 
“principle of sovereignty,” parliament did not indicate that constitu-
tional reforms would have to be adopted to extend that right beyond 
Spain to the nations within.33 The Spanish Constitutional Court de-
termined that sovereignty was not an option for Catalonia, as the 
Declaration clearly affirmed that the Catalan people are already sov-
ereign.34 It is for those reasons, that the Court determined it had no 
option but to invalidate the “principle of sovereignty,” which would 
have granted Catalans the authority to create and sustain its own gov-
ernment by the consent of its own people.35 
In the affirming of the “right to decide”, the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court stated that if the Catalan right to decide was exercised in 
accordance with the existing legal framework, then they had no con-
 29. Id.
 30. Id. (“Opinion polls suggest[ed] that as many as 80% of Catalans want[ed] an official
referendum on the issue of Catalonia’s status, with about 50% in favour of full inde-
pendence”).
 31. Id. (after it had been provisionally suspended on May 8, 2013).
 32. Comella, supra note 9, at 577 (“The procedure the Spanish government used is regu-
lated in Art. 161.2 of the Constitution, as well as in Arts. 76 and 77 of the Ley Orgáni-
ca del Tribunal Constitutional. When the government resorts to this procedure, in order
to attack norms or acts adopted by the Autonomous Communities, the Constitutional
Court must suspend the effects of the challenged norm or act. The Court can after-
wards decide to lift the suspension.”).
 33. Id. (“Under Art. 150.2 of the Spanish Constitution, it is possible for the Spanish par-
liament, by means of an organic statute, to delegate or transfer certain state compe-
tences to the Autonomous Communities. Such a statute can fix the forms of control
that the state is to retain. There is a limit, however, to the use of this mechanism: the
competence involved ′must be of a nature that makes it susceptible to being transferred
or delegated′. There is interpretive controversy as to the scope of this abstract con-
straint.”).
 34. Id. (The Court pointed out that Article 1 of the Spanish Constitution states that nation-
al sovereignty is given to the Spanish people. The Spanish people exercise constituent
power, which runs all state structures. Article 2 asserts that the Spanish Constitution
rests on the indissoluble unity of Spain. The Court highlighted that the Catalan people,
legally speaking, could not be sovereign. This is because their sovereignty would
cause the denial of the sovereignty of the Spanish people. The Court concluded that
two sovereignties could not legally coexist).
 35. Id.
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stitutional objection.36 The Court determined that Spain was not a 
“militant democracy: all political programs can be defended in the 
public sphere.”37 The implementation of those political programs 
merely need to observe existing laws of legal change.38 The Court 
found that the “right to decide” was a “political ‘aspiration,’” which 
can only be realized in following all applicable legal and Constitu-
tional procedures.39 From this decision the Catalans struggled to de-
termine how the “right to decide” can be maintained if the “principle 
of sovereignty” is invalidated.40 
The 2017 Spanish Constitutional Crisis 
Just three years later, on October 1, 2017, the Catalonian parlia-
ment held an official referendum readdressing whether Catalans still 
wanted to secede from Spain through a unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence.41 This vote heavily supported separation from Spain, lead-
ing the Catalonian government to declare independence from Spain.42 
Spain responded by imposing direct rule over Catalonia using Article 
155 of Spain’s Constitution.43 Article 155 gives Spain the right to im-
pose direct rule in “a crisis on any of the country’s semi autonomous 
regions.”44 Spanish law also states that elections must be held within 
six months of Article 155 being invoked.45 Spanish Prime Minister, 
Mariano Rajoy, stated that those elections needed to be “held much 
 36. Comella, supra note 9, at 578 (“The rules on amendment specify that there must first
be a supermajority in parliament that agrees to introduce a particular change. Only
then is a referendum possible (or required). If a referendum were added at the initial
stage, before there was any supermajority agreement in parliament, it would be hard to
preserve the spirit of consenso.”).
 37. Id.
 38. Id.
 39. Id. (“The Constitution, in particular, can be revised in many different directions, and
there is no substantive limit
to the changes that may be brought about through constitutional means.”). 
 40. Id.
 41. Catalonia profile - Timeline, BBC NEWS (Dec. 25, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20345073 (this followed the court barring the
former Catalonia President, Artur Mas, from public office for two years following the
unofficial referendum that took place in 2014).
 42. Id.
 43. Catalonia independence: Spain pushes to remove leaders, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41704759.
 44. Id.
 45. Id.
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sooner.”46 The elections were held on December 21, 2017 and result-
ed in an increasingly large amount of support for secessionist politi-
cians, giving them a slim majority of parliament.47 Now, more than 
ever, Catalonia and Spain need to discuss the legality of Catalonia’s 
decision to unilaterally secede from Spain and can look to other in-
ternational court decisions for guidance. 
The Canadian Supreme Court Ruling on Quebec 
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada made a decision regard-
ing Quebec’s attempt at secession, known as the Reference Re Seces-
sion of Quebec.48 During this discussion, the court was required to 
answer three questions: 
(1) Does Quebec have the right to secede unilaterally from Can-
ada under Canada’s constitution? 
(2) Does Quebec have the right to secede unilaterally from Can-
ada under international law? 
(3) If Canadian law and international law conflict, which law
takes precedence in this case?49 
The reference questions were not calling upon the Canadian Su-
preme Court to “usurp any democratic decision that the people of 
Quebec may be called upon to make.”50 The court emphasized that 
these questions “are strictly limited to aspects of the legal framework 
in which that democratic decision is to be taken.”51 In answering 
these questions, the Canadian Supreme Court looked to two guiding 
principles: (1) the right to self determination; and (2) territorial integ-
 46. Id. (Catalan secessionists claim that Spain has “suspended democracy.” Barcelona
Mayor Ada Colau called the Spanish government’s decision a “serious attack on the
rights and freedoms of all, both here and elsewhere” while calling for demonstrations).
 47. Reuters Staff, Former Catalan leader urges Spain to accept secessionist election win,
REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-
catalonia/former-catalan-leader-urges-spain-to-accept-secessionist-election-win-
idUSKBN1EO0K6 (Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy called for the Catalan par-
liament to be formed on January 17, 2018. Although this was expected to be a long,
drawn-out process of forming a government, no such government has materialized).
 48. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1342.
 49. Id.
 50. Id. at 1346.
 51. Id. (“Since the reference questions may clearly be interpreted as directed to legal is-
sues, the Court is in a position to answer them . . . The questions raise issues of fun-
damental public importance and they are not too imprecise or ambiguous so as not to
permit a proper legal answer.”).
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rity.52 Without these two concepts, the Canadian Supreme Court 
would not have determined the cornerstones in the evaluation of uni-
lateral declarations of independence.53 
The court ruled that “Quebec could not, despite a clear referen-
dum result, purport to invoke a right of self-determination to dictate 
the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to the federa-
tion.”54 The Canadian Constitution provides that a democratic vote 
cannot supersede the rule of law and principles of federalism, as well 
as rights of minorities and individuals, or democracy in Canada.55 
This means that a mere vote by the people, official or not, would 
have no bearing on whether there is a right to secession under self-
determination. However, a clear will of the people would place an 
obligation on both other provinces and the federal government to en-
ter into a negotiation with “underlying constitutional principles” to 
resolve issues such as secession.56 The Canadian Supreme Court 
viewed the Constitution as more than a written text.57 The court de-
termined that “the principles of federalism, democracy, constitution-
alism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities” must be taken 
into consideration.58 The identification of these underlying issues 
would be more likely to lead to a mutually beneficial resolution. 
The Canadian Supreme Court went so far as to address the nego-
tiation process between Quebec and Canada.59 The Canadian Su-
 52. Id. at 1342.
 53. Id.
 54. Id. at 1344.
 55. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1343 (“Democratic rights under
the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations. Nor, however, can
the reverse proposition be accepted: the continued existence and operation of the Ca-
nadian constitutional order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear ma-
jority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada.”).
 56. Id. (“The other provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the
right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession should a clear majority of the
people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects the rights
of others.”).
 57. Id. (The Canadian Supreme Court explained that the Constitution “embraces the entire
global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional au-
thority.”  Interpreting the Constitution in a superficial manner would likely be mislead-
ing).
 58. Id. (“Those principles must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional rights
and obligations that would come into play in the event that a clear majority of Quebec-
ers votes on a clear question in favour of secession.”).
 59. Id. at 1343.
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preme Court found that “[t]he Court has no supervisory role over the 
political aspects of constitutional negotiations.”60 The Court did not 
step into such matters as they did not wish to “usurp the prerogatives 
of the political forces that operate” within the constitutional frame-
work.61 Clearly, the Canadian Supreme Court will only step in as a 
last resort to these types of problems.62 In outlining negotiations that 
would follow a vote in favor of secession, the Court emphasized that 
the law would not lead to predetermined conclusions on any issue.63 
The court noted, “Negotiations would need to address the interests of 
the other provinces, the federal government, Quebec and indeed the 
rights of all Canadians both within and outside Quebec, and specifi-
cally the rights of minorities to ensure fair treatment during the im-
plementation of a secession.”64 
When it examined international law, the Canadian Court found 
that secession may arise under the principle of self-determination in 
three circumstances: 
(1) When ‘a people’ is governed as a part of a colonial empire;
(2) Where ‘a people’ is subject to alien subjugation, domination
or exploitation; 
(3) Where ‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its
right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part.65 
It is important to note that “a people” was not concretely defined 
within the scope of international law.66 However, the Canadian Su-
preme Court determined that whatever the correct definition of “a 
people” would be in this scenario, “their right of self-determination 
cannot in the present circumstances be said to ground a right to uni-
lateral secession.”67 The Canadian Supreme Court found no existence 
of human rights violations, mistreatment by the Canadian govern-
ment, or a situation that would have kept people in Quebec from their 
 60. Id.
 61. Id. at 1344.
 62. See Id. at 1366 (“The reconciliation of the various legitimate constitutional interests is
necessarily committed to the political rather than the judicial realm precisely because
that reconciliation can only be achieved through the give and take of political negotia-
tions.”).
 63. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3,  at 1344.
 64. Id.
 65. Id.
 66. Id. at 1370.
 67. Id.
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fundamental rights, especially to that of self-determination.68 The Ca-
nadian Supreme Court ultimately concluded that there was no exist-
ing conflict between Canadian and international law that needed to be 
addressed.69 
On the other hand, the Canadian Supreme Court found that it is 
possible there are other circumstances that constitute secession, even 
when the provinces are not considered to be oppressed, subjugated, or 
exploited.70 This means self-determination is possible within the 
framework of an existing state.71 The court explained that: 
“A state whose government represents the whole of the people or 
peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without 
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its 
internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity 
under international law and to have that territorial integrity recog-
nized by other states.”72 
Where the right to self-determination is possible, it must be ex-
ercised “consistently with the territorial integrity of states.”73 The Su-
preme Court of Canada essentially determined that self-determination 
and territorial integrity cannot exist without one another.74 The court 
found that Quebec did not meet the criteria for being considered ei-
ther a colonial people or an oppressed people.75 They were also not 
 68. Id. at 1344. (In reaching this conclusion, the Canadian Supreme Court looked to the
three situations under which self-determination would be allowed).
 69. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1368 (“International law contains
neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit denial of such a right, although
such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the exceptional circumstances required for
secession to be permitted under the right of a people to self-determination.”)
 70. Id. at 1369.
 71. Id. (Self-determination is now such a widely known concept in the international
community that “international law expects that the right to self-determination will be
exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistent-
ly with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states.” Where operating
within the framework of an existing sovereign state is not possible, as seen in the situa-
tions discussed above, a right of secession could arise).
 72. Id.
 73. Id. (In international law, the principle of self-determination has grown over time with-
in a framework that respects the territorial integrity of existing states. Typically, inter-
national documents that support a right to self-determination also support that exercis-
ing such a right must be limited. This is done to prevent threats to the territorial
integrity of an existing state or to maintain stable relations between states that are al-
ready sovereign).
 74. Id.
 75. Id.
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denied meaningful access by the government to pursue economic, 
cultural, political, and social development.76 This conclusion lead to 
the ruling that Quebec did not have the right under international law 
to unilaterally secede from Canada.77 
The International Court of Justice Ruling on Kosovo 
On July 22, 2010 the International Court of Justice ruled that 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008 
was legal under international law.78 Judge Hisashi Owada, president 
of the ICJ, stated that, “The court considers that general international 
law contains no applicable prohibition of declaration of independ-
ence.”79 In addressing the unilateral declaration of independence of 
Kosovo from Serbia, both the ICJ and North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (hereinafter “NATO”) analyzed existing international law re-
garding the right to self-determination and the concept of territorial 
integrity by utilizing several international legal sources to support 
their conclusions.80 
 76. Id. (The court found that “such exceptional circumstances are manifestly inapplicable
to Quebec under existing conditions. Accordingly, neither the population of the prov-
ince of Quebec, even if characterized in terms of “people” or “peoples”, nor its repre-
sentative institutions, the National Assembly, the legislature or government of Quebec,
possess a right, under international law, to secede unilaterally from Canada.”)
 77. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1370 (“Although there is no right,
under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession, the possibility of
an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession is not ruled
out. The ultimate success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by
the international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of
secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in
determining whether to grant or withhold recognition. Even if granted, such recogni-
tion would not, however, provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession,
either under the Constitution of Canada or at international law.”).
 78. Reed Stevenson & Adam Tanner, Kosovo independence declaration deemed legal,
REUTERS (July 21, 2010),  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-kosovo/kosovo-
independence-declaration-deemed-legal-idUSTRE66L01720100722 (much to the cha-
grin of Serbian President Boris Tadic, who insisted that Serbia would never recognize
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence).
 79. Id.
 80. Accordance, supra note 7 at ¶ 80 (quoting Article 1, Paragraph 4 of the United Na-
tions Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
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The legal decision in Kosovo was heavily rooted within the 
United Nations charter, more specifically, Article 1(2).81 The princi-
ple of self-determination is first explicitly discussed in Article 1(2), 
which explains that one of the primary purposes of the United Na-
tions (hereinafter “UN”) is “‘to develop friendly relations among na-
tions based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.’”82 Without the respect of those rights and 
principles there is no way to move forward in situations involving the 
unilateral secession. The UN’s discussion of self-determination was 
made in the “context of friendly relations among nations and in con-
junction with ‘equal rights’ of peoples.” 83 NATO also stated that the 
UN Charter should be read with the knowledge that it is impossible to 
achieve universal peace without self-determination.84 
This NATO report takes the opportunity to define self-determination as it ap-
plies to issues of unilateral secession. The NATO report defines self-determination 
as: 
An essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance 
of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening 
of those rights. Furthermore, self-determination is defined as an inal-
ienable right of all peoples and imposes corresponding obligations, 
and the rights and . . . obligations concerning its implementation are 
interrelated with other provisions and rules of international law.85 
This means that the right to self-determination comes into play in 
situations where individuals’ rights are not being observed and main-
 81. North Atlantic Treaty Org. [NATO], The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Per-
spective: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and the NATO Intervention, Final
Report, at 8, 9 (June 16, 2001), https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/kumbaro.pdf
[Hereinafter The Kosovo Crisis].
 82. The Kosovo Crisis, supra note 82, at 10 (the report also discusses Article 55 as it is
applicable to Kosovo:” Article 55 instructs the UN to promote higher standards of liv-
ing, solutions to health and cultural problems, and universal respect for human rights
“with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are neces-
sary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self determination of peoples.”).
 83. Id. at 11 (it is important to note that the UN Charter, as a whole, is not comprehensive
in addressing either external or internal self-determination. The UN Charter refers to it
only as a “principle” rather than a “right”).
 84. Id.
 85. Id. at 13; See General Comment UN DOC. CCPR/C/21/Add.3. 24 at para. 2 (the right
of self-determination seen here is considered by the UN as a universal right).
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tained.86 Additionally, NATO found that such a right is absolute and 
imposing that right comes with certain obligations. It is within the 
aforementioned context and definitional analysis that a court must de-
termine if a province or region has the right to unilaterally declare in-
dependence and secede.87 
The ICJ recognized that the right of self-determination is for “the 
peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien 
subjugation, domination, and exploitation.”88 However, the ICJ clari-
fied that those types of rights are typically only relevant in instances 
of either colonialism or the independence of once-colonial territo-
ries.89 It is important to note that the ICJ explicitly states that in States 
where those situations do not exist, that it “does not point to the 
emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making 
of a declaration of independence in such cases.”90 Even though the 
UN Security Council has issued resolutions denouncing situations in-
volving unilateral declarations of independence, those resolutions 
were only made in situations involving unlawful use of force or other 
international law violations.91 In the case of Kosovo, the court deter-
mined that Serbia had been exerting an unlawful use of force on the 
people of Kosovo in a way that violated their rights.92 After analyzing 
these violations, the ICJ ruled that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
 86. Id. (“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development. “ INT’L COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, UNGA, Dec.
19, 1966, art. 1).
 87. Id. (The report determines that “every people or nation is free to establish its own po-
litical institutions, to develop its own economic resources, and to direct its own social
and cultural evolution, without the interference of other peoples or nations.”).
 88. Accordance, supra note 7, at 436 (Meaning self-determination is for people that are
under the control of non-citizens or foreigners in a way that violates their basic human
rights).
 89. Id.
 90. Id. (It is of equal importance to note that “a great many new States have come into
existence as a result of the exercise of this right. There were, however, also instances
of declarations of independence outside this context.”).
 91. Id. at 437.
 92. Id (For violations of human rights in Kosovo, See generally, U.S. Dept. of State, Bu-
reau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Kosovo 2016 Human Rights Report
(2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265648.pdf.).
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independence from Serbia was not a violation of general international 
law.93 
The ICJ also addressed the argument that the principle of territo-
rial integrity creates a prohibition of unilateral declarations of inde-
pendence.94 The ICJ pointed to Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Char-
ter, which states: “All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”95 The international 
community has found the scope of the principle of territorial integrity 
to be “confined to the sphere of relations between States.”96 
The analysis of territorial integrity continued with the examina-
tion of Security Council Resolution 1244 97 and The United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (hereinafter “UNMIK”), 
which provided the constitutional framework for Kosovo in this sit-
uation.98 The UN Security Council Resolution granted the UNMIK 
power to set up the constitutional framework for Kosovo.99 The Con-
stitutional framework in the UNMIK was made to function “as part 
of a specific legal order  . . . which is applicable only in Kosovo and 
the purpose of which is to regulate, during the interim phase  . . . mat-
ters which would ordinarily be the subject of internal, rather than in-
 93. Id. (“the illegality attached to the [previously addressed] declarations of independence
[by the ICJ] thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as
such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlaw-
ful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in
particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens). In the context of Kosovo, the
Security Council has never taken this position.”).
 94. Accordance, supra note 7, at 437.
 95. Id.; U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2 (Territorial integrity exists in situations involving unilat-
eral declarations of independence in instances where a nation has acted inconsistently
with the purposes of the United Nations).
 96. Id.
 97. Id. at 440-4.
 98. Id. at 439-42 (The UNMIK created a constitutional framework for Kosovo that “took
effect as part of the body of law adopted for the administration of Kosovo during the
interim phase. The institutions which it created were empowered by the Constitutional
Framework to take decisions which took effect within that body of law. In particular,
the Assembly of Kosovo was empowered to adopt legislation which would have the
force of law within that legal order, subject always to the overriding authority of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General”).
 99. Id. (The ICJ was brought in to address “the question whether the authors of the decla-
ration of independence acted in violation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)”).
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ternational, law.”100  The ICJ concluded that neither document pro-
hibited the unilateral declaration of independence from Kosovo, 
meaning there was no violation of international law.101 
THE POWER OF PERSUASION (IN TERMS OF OTHER COURT
RULINGS) 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s Ruling and its Ramifications on 
Catalonia 
In applying the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling on Quebec to 
the current situation in Catalonia look at the findings made about the 
right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. 
The Canadian Supreme Court held that clear referendum results do 
not automatically mean that a province has the right to self-
determination.102 It is evident that the Catalonian referendum was 
largely in favor of unilateral secession from Spain,103 but if the court 
looks to the Canadian precedent, that vote does not guarantee self-
determination for those voters. The vote is merely an expression of 
the will of the people, which it is not mandatory for Spain to honor. 
According to Reference re Secession of Quebec, there are three pos-
sible for situational criteria which could justify a declaration of self-
determination.104 Although Catalonia has a history of fighting for in-
dependence from Spain, the region itself was never oppressed or col-
onized.105 This means that Catalonia has already failed to meet two-
 100. Id. at 440.
 101. Accordance, supra note 7, at 452-3 (“The Court has concluded above that the adop-
tion of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general in-
ternational law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Frame-
work. Consequently, the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable
rule of international law.”).
 102. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
 103. Catalan referendum: preliminary results show 90% in favour of independence, supra
note 1.
 104. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
 105. Catalan Crisis: Why does Catalonia want independence? Do the majority really sup-
port it?, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 29, 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalan-crisis-why-does-catalonia-
want-independence-do-people-really-support-it-spain-latest-a8025836.html ((“For
decades the Catalans suffered under [Francisco Franco’s] harsh rule as political oppo-
sition was violently suppressed as well as their autonomy, language and culture. Their
regional government was only restored in 1979, four years after his death.” So the Cat-
alans are not currently facing any sort of subjugation or oppression like they have pre-
viously).
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out-of-three possible criteria identified by the Canadian Supreme 
Court that would allow for a unilateral secession and declaration of 
independence from Spain. 
In Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Canadian Supreme 
Court reached the conclusion that territorial integrity could not exist 
without being exercised alongside self-determination.106 This means 
that Catalonia could potentially meet the required standard for self-
determination within the framework of their already-existing state.107 
If the Spanish government denied the Catalonians the right to pursue 
political, economic, social or cultural development, that could pro-
vide a basis for a unilateral secession by Catalonia.108 However, there 
is no evidence that Catalans are being denied any such rights.109 Cata-
lonians are allowed their own government, economy, and language, 
which separates them from Spain.110 It also helps to maintain the 
growth of their own society and culture.111 The Spanish government 
is merely trying to keep Catalonia from seceding on the grounds that 
such a secession would violate international law and be detrimental, 
not only to Catalonia, but to other regions in Spain.112 
The Canadian Supreme Court also determined that territorial in-
tegrity prohibits any unilateral secession unless the circumstances 
meet the criteria that could trigger the right of self-determination.113 
“International law places great importance on the territorial integrity 
of nation states and, by and large, leaves the creation of a new state to 
be determined by the domestic law of the existing state of which the 
seceding entity presently forms a part.”114 Catalonia would essentially 
 106. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1369.
 107. Id. (“A state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident
within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the
principles of self-determination in its own internal arrangements, is entitled to the pro-
tection under international law of its territorial integrity.”).
 108. Id.
 109. Catalan Crisis, supra note 106.
 110. Id.
 111. Id. (“Catalonia has always seen itself as separate from the rest of Spain as it has his-
torically had its own regional government.”).
 112. Id. (“Catalonia is the richest region in Spain and if it successfully seceded Madrid
could lose 20 per cent of its GDP.”).
 113. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
 114. Id. at 1372 (In regards to Quebec, “unilateral secession would be incompatible with
the domestic Constitution, international law is likely to accept that conclusion subject
to the right of peoples to self-determination”).
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have to look at the rules governing the entirety of Spain to influence 
their own domestic legal choices. The emphasis would be placed on 
Catalonia’s ability to take the Spanish Constitution and apply it to 
their own situation in a manner that works out in their favor. Howev-
er, given that Catalonia has not managed to apply the law in an effec-
tive way, it is likely that they would not succeed if they were to seek 
unilateral secession in the same manner. Catalonia does not meet any 
of the requirements needed to invoke self-determination under territo-
rial integrity, which would also likely would prohibit Catalonia from 
making a unilateral declaration of independence. 
As seen in Reference re Secession of Quebec, Catalonia’s only 
hope to invoke the right of self-determination would be with Spain’s 
authorization of that right. Unfortunately, this path is not an option as 
Spain has already ruled multiple times that Catalonia does not have a 
right to either declare independence or an ability to unilaterally se-
cede.115 Catalonia does not meet the criteria needed to invoke the 
right of self-determination or territorial integrity. In analyzing and 
applying the court ruling in Reference re Secession of Quebec, it is 
clear that under international law, Catalonia does not have a right to 
unilaterally secede from Spain.  Catalonia would also likely not be 
successful and in making a unilateral declaration of independence. 
The International Court of Justice’s Ruling and its Ramifications 
on Catalonia 
In order to address the situation in Kosovo, the ICJ asked itself 
the following question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence 
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in ac-
cordance with international law?”116 To both answer that question and 
apply the ruling on Kosovo’s unilateral secession from Serbia and the 
current situation in Catalonia, emphasis must be placed upon the 
 115. Comella, supra note 9, at 572 (“The Spanish Court, in contrast [to the Canadian Su-
preme Court], derived two consequences from the idea that the Spanish people is sov-
ereign: Catalonia cannot secede unilaterally, and it cannot hold a referendum on inde-
pendence unilaterally.”).
 116. Accordance, supra note 7, at 423 (It is important to not the following: “the question is
narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the declaration
of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal
consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo
has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recog-
nition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent State.”).
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ICJ’s analysis of self-determination and the principle of territorial in-
tegrity. In regards to Kosovo, the ICJ found that the right to self-
determination was present in situations where people had been ex-
ploited, subjugated and dominated.117 Although they have spent many 
years fighting for their independence, Catalans have not been treated 
with colonialism by the Spanish government, nor have they been op-
pressed since their regional government was restored in 1979.118 They 
have been allowed to thrive economically and contribute greatly to 
the overall welfare of Spain while running their own government.119 
Catalans are simply attempting to secede because they believe that 
they are not receiving the amount of freedom or independence from 
Spain that they feel they deserve.120 
The ICJ has also explained that, in terms of United Nations’ 
sanctions, the right to self-determination was only prohibited in in-
stances where other violations of international law or an abusive use 
of force were present.121 Spain has, until recently, increased their po-
lice presence and threatened to take control of Catalonia using Article 
155.122 However, Spain is allowed to exert control over a province in 
the event of a crisis: 
(1) “If a Self-governing Community does not fulfil the obliga-
tions imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws, or acts in a 
way that is seriously prejudicial to the general interest of Spain, the 
Government, after having lodged a complaint with the President of 
the Self-governing Community and failed to receive satisfaction 
therefore, may, following approval granted by the overall majority of 
the Senate, take all measures necessary to compel the Community to 
 117. Accordance, supra note 7, at 436.
 118. Catalan Crisis, supra note 106.
 119. Id. ((However, their contribution to the overall welfare of Spain means that “many
Catalans feel they are paying high taxes and suffering under austerity to shore up the
profligacy of a country they have little in common with. A large proportion believe
they will be wealthier and more successful if they go it alone in future.”).
 120. The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’, supra
note 9, at 573.
 121. Accordance, supra note 7, at 436 (“The illegality attached to the declarations of inde-
pendence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such,
but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use
of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particu-
lar those of a peremptory character.”).
 122. Catalonia independence: Spain pushes to remove leaders, supra note 43.
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meet said obligations, or to protect the abovementioned general inter-
est. 
(2) To execute the measures foreseen in the previous section,
the government may give instructions to all of the authorities in
the autonomous communities.”123 
The fact that Article 155 is written into the Spanish Constitution 
grants them power to impose direct control over a region that is going 
through a crisis, much like Catalonia is now. The article directly 
highlights that there is no abuse of force here, but rather, and invoca-
tion of the right to control. The ongoing public demonstrations, boy-
cotting, and marches held within Catalonia reveal that the province is 
facing a crisis of political unrest that does not appear to be going 
away any time soon.124 Under Article 155, the Spanish government 
should be allowed to rule over Catalonia until either some of the vio-
lence can be quelled or there are successful negotiations between the 
pro-unity and secessionist parties. 
In addressing the issue of territorial integrity, the ICJ differs 
from the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling.125 Here, the ICJ held that 
territorial integrity does not automatically prohibit unilateral declara-
tions of independence.126 However, under the ICJ’s advisory opinion,  
it is not likely that Catalonia will have as strong an argument as Ko-
sovo did in terms of the constitutionality of their claim to independ-
ence.127 Kosovo’s constitutional framework was set up by the 
UNMIK and did not prohibit a declaration of independence.128 The 
framework itself was set up as a way to start Kosovo with a “clean 
slate” and to address the issues they faced while still a part of Ser-
 123. SPANISH CONST. Dec. 27, 1978, art. 155.
 124. Catalan Crisis, supra note 106 (Also, there does not seem to be an immediate risk of
military forces being deployed into the street. However, given that political leaders of
the secessionist movement have been arrested or are in asylum, if negotiations do not
take place, it is likely that the military will eventually have to get involved).
 125. Accordance, supra note 7, at 437 (“The question put to the Supreme Court of Canada
inquired whether there was a right to “effect secession”, and whether there was a rule
of international law which conferred a positive entitlement on any of the organs
named. By contrast, the General Assembly [in addressing Kosovo] has asked whether
the declaration of independence was “in accordance with” international law.”).
 126. Id.
 127. See generally Accordance, supra note 7 (as previously stated, there was no human
rights violations or subjugation of the Catalans by the Spanish government, which was
the case with Serbia and Kosovo).
 128. Id.
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bia.129 In regards to Catalonia, the Spanish Constitution deemed the 
October 1 referendum, which would have legitimized a declaration of 
independence from Spain, to be unconstitutional.130 This further com-
plicates matters for Catalonia because they are unable to make a uni-
lateral declaration through such an explicit and simple declaration as 
was the case in Kosovo.131 At this point there is no simple way for 
Catalonia to make a declaration of independence from Spain, as nei-
ther a referendum nor an explicit declaration is allowed under the rul-
ings of the Spanish Constitutional Court.132 
It is not possible to achieve peace without self-determination un-
der the United Nations Charter.133 For Catalonia, this means that there 
will likely be no peace between the Catalans and the Spanish gov-
ernment until they negotiate a path for self-determination for Catalo-
nia.134 Additionally, NATO’s report on Kosovo held that self-
determination is a right of all peoples and must be mindful in terms 
of international law, which is at issue today in Catalonia.135 Although, 
self-determination is a right, it is not guaranteed to go into effect un-
less the proper criteria are satisfied.136 This criterion can be constitu-
tional, procedural or even regulatory and must be examined on a 
case-by-case basis. In the case of Catalonia, certain constitutional re-
quirements and provisions would need to be met in order for Spain to 
allow them to secede.137 Any court could consciously decide to use 
 129. Id. at 426.
 130. Catalonia independence: Spain pushes to remove leaders, supra note 43.
 131. Accordance, supra note 7, at 426.
 132. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
 133. The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, Territo-
rial Integrity and the NATO Intervention, supra note 82, at 11.
 134. See generally Accordance, supra note 7.
 135. See generally The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to De-
cide’, supra note 9 (“There are no constitutional principles that are immune against
modification through the applicable procedures of revision. Even the principles that es-
tablish the unity of Spain and the sovereignty of the Spanish people can be altered in
the future through the pertinent amendment. Indeed, if the Spanish people, legally
speaking, only exists as a creature of the Constitution, there is no limit to the kinds of
transformations that the Spanish people can undergo in the future, including its partial
fragmentation. Secession is therefore not excluded as a legal possibility.”).
 136. See generally Accordance, supra note 7.
 137. The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’, supra
note 9, at 573 (“So if the ′right  to decide′  means the future status of Catalonia  is to be
exercised according to the existing constitutional framework, including the rules on
constitutional amendment, there is nothing legally wrong with it. It is merely a politi-
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the rationale implemented in the case of Kosovo to explore the legali-
ty of unilateral secession in another country. 
In applying the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Kosovo to the case of 
Catalonia, they cannot simply declare their independence nor do they 
qualify to invoke the right to self-determination, with or without terri-
torial integrity.138 Catalonia’s attempt to hold both unofficial and offi-
cial referendums to achieve secession would not succeed based upon 
the ICJ opinion on Kosovo.139 It is under that opinion that Catalonia 
would also not qualify to invoke the right to self-determination as 
their current status/relationship with Spain does not meet any of the 
criterion.140 This means that Catalonia does not have the right to ei-
ther declare independence or unilaterally secede from Spain under in-
ternational law.141 
What These Ramifications Mean for Catalonia 
The responsibility has fallen upon Spain to handle this issue in-
ternally as other international bodies have declined to get involved 
with the situation. This problem is of the utmost importance to Spain 
because of the growing levels of violence and unrest currently dis-
played taking place on the international stage.142 The amount of me-
dia attention, not to mention the political attention, can lead to either 
both or one of the parties to be internationally humiliated or can even 
create tension in the international political realm. The Spanish Con-
stitutional Court chose to take an almost contradictory stance on the 
cal ′aspiration′, the Court wrote, that can only be realized through the applicable con-
stitutional procedures.”).  
 138. See generally Accordance, supra note 7.
 139. Id. (In Kosovo, the unilateral action to declare independence could not be reconciled
with the UN Security Council resolution 1244. In Catalonia, the same unilateral action
also fails as it constitutes a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1244).
 140. Id. (in applying the criterion previously discussed, Catalonia is not enacting a “reme-
dial secession,” which was the situation in Kosovo).
 141. Id. (Keeping in mind that this is the application of two recent international holdings
on this issue, it is possible that Catalonia could declare international independence or
unilaterally secede from Spain under Spanish law. This is depending upon whether the
Spanish Constitution/government would allow this to happen).
 142. Catalan Crisis, supra note 106 (without a resolution to this situation, it is possible that
other states or nations around the world could decide to rise up and make a unilateral
declaration of independence for secession on their on. Internally, without a resolution,
Spain runs the risk of other autonomous communities attempted to unilaterally secede
as well. The political unrest in Catalonia alone is hard to keep at bay, but if more states
get involved Spain will have an even bigger problem on their hands).
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issue as an attempt to appease both Spain and Catalonia.143 This 
means that the Spanish Constitutional Court needs to reach a more 
concrete verdict, which can only be done by slowly and meticulously 
looking over both the proposed manner of secession and the relative 
articles within the Spanish Constitution. 
If the Spanish Constitutional Court would not be willing to pass 
a more concrete judgment, then Spain and Catalonia would have to 
look to another court to resolve their issues, possibly involving the 
United Nations in their attempt at resolution. Whichever court takes 
on this case will also need to look to international examples such as 
the aforementioned secession decisions regarding both Quebec and 
Kosovo. Again, these opinions are not binding on the situation in 
Catalonia, but can offer the court insight into how decisions regard-
ing these matters are made. The cases of Kosovo and Quebec can of-
fer the court key criteria to consider while evaluating the legality of 
Catalonia’s unilateral secession of Spain. It is important to note that, 
in order to be thorough and fair, whichever court addresses this issue 
should look at the situation through both the lens of international law 
and the lens of what is allowed under the Spanish Constitution. 
Through the above analysis it is clear that Catalonia does not have the 
legal right to unilaterally secede from Spain. 
Conclusion 
If it is found that Catalonia does have the international legal right 
to unilaterally secede from Spain, it will set a precedent that could al-
low other Spanish provinces to pursue the same course of action. Not 
only that, but this secession, if allowed, would clearly affect the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural makeup of Spain as a country. If this sort 
of change were to be allowed in Spain, it could potentially indicate to 
other nations within states throughout the world that they too can se-
cede. From the analysis of Quebec, Kosovo, and Catalonia a bigger 
picture will be revealed regarding the circumstances under which a 
nation can unilaterally secede from the state it is a part of. 
 143. The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’, supra
note 9 (“In order to reach unanimity, some intermediate solution had to be worked out.
Basically, the Court invalidated one part of the challenged Declaration, while it upheld
the other (provided, however, that the latter was read in a constitutionally proper man-
ner)”).
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In analyzing the legal situation between Catalonia and Spain, it 
is important to look at other similar situations for persuasive prece-
dent. Through further analysis of the Canadian Supreme Court’s rul-
ing on Quebec and the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo it is clear 
that two prongs must be examined: (1) the right to self-determination; 
and (2) territorial integrity.144 By looking at Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, it is clear that in order to invoke the right of self-
determination one must have been experiencing colonialism, subject 
to domination, exploitation or subjugation or denied exercise of the 
right to self determination.145 These criteria for invoking the right to 
self-determination were also utilized in the ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
Kosovo.146 It is clear that Catalonia cannot claim unilateral secession 
under the principle of self-determination. 
However, the courts addressing Quebec and Kosovo differ over 
the application of the principle of territorial integrity. The Canadian 
Supreme Court held that territorial integrity prohibits unilateral decla-
rations of independence in situations where the right to self-
determination does not exist.147 On the other hand, the ICJ found that 
territorial integrity did not prohibit unilateral declarations of inde-
pendence.148 In applying the ruling on Quebec it is clear that Catalo-
nia cannot qualify for territorial integrity. Based upon the ICJ’s Advi-
sory Opinion, Catalonia cannot simply declare their independence 
nor do they qualify to invoke the right to self-determination, with or 
without territorial integrity. This means that, in using either the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court or ICJ’s decision persuasively, Catalonia can-
not make a unilateral declaration of independence and secession from 
Spain under international law. 
 144. See generally Accordance, supra note 7.
 145. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1344.
 146. Accordance, supra note 7, at 436.
 147. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 3, at 1369.
 148. Accordance, supra note 7, at 437; U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
